

Арпад Хорняк

**ТЕРРИТОРИАЛЬНЫЕ СПОРЫ МЕЖДУ ВЕНГРИЕЙ
И КОРОЛЕВСТВОМ СЕРБОВ, ХОРВАТОВ И СЛОВЕНЦЕВ
В 1918–1921 ГОДАХ**

В статье анализируется международная обстановка, сложившаяся в Центральной Европе по итогам окончания Первой мировой войны. В результате военного поражения и распада Австро-Венгерской империи возник ряд независимых национальных государств. Вопрос о границах молодых государств решался под влиянием держав-победительниц. Определены интересы и позиции Великих держав в ходе Парижской мирной конференции, повлиявшие на процесс формирования территорий новых европейских государств. Делегации, участвовавшие в мирной конференции, находились в неравных условиях, так как одни представляли сторону победителей, а другие побежденных. Состав делегаций и их позиция зависели от политических процессов, происходивших на родине. В сложных и конфликтных ситуациях роль арбитров принадлежала Великим державам, которые исходили из своих международных приоритетов. Основное внимание уделено противоречиям и территориальным спорам, имевшим место, в частности, между Венгрией и Королевством сербов, хорватов и словенцев в исторической области Воеводина. Автор показывает сложный комплекс политических, этнических, культурных факторов, определивших отношения государств, возникших в результате распада Австро-Венгерской империи.

Парижская мирная конференция; Великие державы; Венгрия; Королевство сербов, хорватов и словенцев; границы; город Печ

The Serbian political elite dealt relatively little with the territorial extension of Serbia to the North at the expense of Kingdom of Hungary before the First World War (if we compare it with its aims towards Bosnia and Macedonia). Nevertheless, the Great War brought radical changes in this, too. As early as in September 1914 the Serbian Government made it clear to its representatives abroad and to the Serbian public that Southern parts of Hungary, mostly the recent Vojvodina, are integral and important parts of its war aims.

This newly gained importance in the Serbian political thought Vojvodina kept during the whole period of the war and even after though there were some phases when less attention was given to it. The reason simply was that its claims against Hungary were hardly opposed and the south Slav troops (Serbian troops) occupied all the desired northern territories¹ while the new born Kingdom of the Serbs Croats and Slovenians had to conduct a desperate diplomatic fight against Italy and against its another so called ally, Romania until June 1919.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Serbian/Yugoslav troops controlled all those territories desired from Hungary the placement of the border was a matter to be decided by the Peace Conference and within it by a narrower group representing the Great Powers, namely the Supreme Council.

During the first year after the war the determination of the international border played a decisive role. The placement of the border was a matter to be decided by the Peace Conference and within it by a narrower group representing the Great Powers, namely the Supreme Council, consisting of the heads of government and the foreign ministers of the Big Five. Representatives of the vanquished countries were not invited to these deliberations. The Yugoslav delegation could participate in the Peace Conference but as a new and hitherto not recognized country and having one of the Great Powers, Italy, as a mortal enemy it was faced in Paris with numerous uncertainties. This was largely the reason why the position of the Yugoslav government about its northern border and about its relationship to Hungary varied repeatedly. Its policies can be divided into five distinct phases.

Prior to discussing these phases I consider it important to draw the reader's attention to one situation which fundamentally determined Yugoslavia's behavior vis-à-vis Hungary at the Peace Conference. This was the fact that at the beginning of 1919 the territorial demands of Yugoslavia were

¹ The legal besement of the Serbian occupation was provided by the Belgrade Military Convention of November 13, 1918 that ordered among others the withdrawal of the Hungarian army behind the demarcation lines (Szatmárnémeti-Arad-Szeged-Szabadka-Baja-Pécs) and allowed the advance of the entente troops (mostly Serb troops).

really just adjustments at least so far as the line of demarcation was concerned. The Hungarian-Yugoslav border had been, for all practical purposes, set by demarcation line that was drawn in the Belgrade Military Convention and by occupation of the Muraköz (Međimurje) in December, not counting the Muravidék (Prekmurje).² The line of demarcation was not identical with the final border and later events prove that there was little difference between the temporary and definitive border. Yugoslavia already controlled the areas it wanted to acquire and expected the Peace Conference to endorse the already existing situation. In fact, the Peace Conference awarded almost all of the occupied and “temporarily” taken areas to the new Yugoslav State. The only exception to this was the Baranya and Pécs area. It should be noted that the Yugoslav Peace Delegation arrived in Paris with the view that the significant territorial demands vis-à-vis Hungary had already been met. None of the Great Powers debated this point. The awarding of the Vajdaság (Vojvodina) to Yugoslavia, at a later date, was debated only very briefly and was considered only as an assignment of a marginal area.³ Equally, the attachment of Croatia and Slavonia to Yugoslavia was not a matter for debate because these territories were ceded by Hungary without any heart aches.⁴

The first phase lasted from the arrival of the delegation until the middle of February. Because the delegation did not have a universally worked out official concept, this period was used to formulate such a plan. Depending on their nationality, the members of the delegation worked out in detail which areas they wanted to acquire and this was based largely on where these nationalities were living. Thus the border line in the north and, particularly the acquisition of the Bánát and parts of the Bácska were of particular importance to the Serb politicians. The Croats wanted primarily the Muraköz and the Slovenes wanted the Muravidék included within the borders of the new country.

During the formulation of the demands there was an argument between the Croat and Serb members about the principle on which the demands should be based. The Croats wanted to use the national-ethnic principle because it was on this basis that they believed that their demands could be implemented against Italy. It was evident to the Serbs that the national-ethnic principle would not allow them to claim the Bánát region which they considered essential for the defense of the country. For this reason they wanted to use the strategic principle. The debate ultimately led to a compromise which both contenders could view as a victory for their point of view. The Croats believed this because they could use the national-ethnic principle in the formulation of their demands and the Serb members of the delegation because the delegation accepted, with some modification, the proposal made to the Supreme War Council of the Allies by General Pešić, discussed above.⁵ These modifications were important from a Hungarian perspective because the agreed upon memorandum no longer contained the northern part of Bácska and Baranya (Baja and Pécs) and also left Szigetvár to Hungary.⁶ Even these demands, however, made a claim for the Muravidék and for Mohács.

The Yugoslav Peace Delegation submitted its territorial demands to the Supreme Council on February 18. It used historical, ethnic, ethnographic and strategic arguments for the Bánát as well as for the Bácska and Baranya. It questioned the accuracy of the Hungarian census and indicated that in the Bánát 20 percent of the Hungarian population had no roots in the area and would leave when the

² The Muraköz was occupied by the Croats on December 25, 1918, and was kept by them thereafter. (Fogarassy László, *A Magyar-delszláv kapcsolatok katonai története 1918–1921* [The military history of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations, 1918–1921], *Baranyai helytörténetírás: a Baranya Megyei Levéltár évkönyve* 16, no. 1 (1986): 537–539.)

³ According to the recollections of Stanoje Stajonević, who attended the Peace Conference as an expert, there was never any doubt that they would be given the Vojvodina: “We got the Vojvodina easily and without any fight and the debate was only about the size of some of the Vojvodina components. The battle was about getting the eastern Bánát, northwestern Bácska and north Baranya, namely Temesvár, Baja and Pécs. It was obvious right from the start that we would get almost all of Bácska and one part of Baranya.” (In Stanoje Stajonević, “Vojvodina na Konferenciji mira” [The Vojvodina at the peace conference], in *Letopis Matice srpske*, book 300, (Za godine 1914–1921), 83.) The Romanian border commission was given the task of drawing the Hungarian-Yugoslav border on February 18. On February 28 the commission stated its position that the border would follow “the line recommended basically by the Serbs.” (See Francis Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, 1972), 48.)

⁴ The governmental bodies of the Monarchy recognized it just a few days after the Zagreb National Council’s declaration of separation. Károlyi and his group declared, at the time of the Belgrade Convention that they made no claims for it.

⁵ In General Pešić’s plans, identical with the plans of the Serb government and of the military leadership, evolved during the war, strategic principles were the determining factors. The plan was submitted in January, 1919 to the senior military staff of the Allies as the official territorial demands of the SCS Kingdom. The submission bypassed the delegation. According to the plan the border went from Lippa along the mouth of the Maros, directly below Szeged. It went 15 kilometers north of Szabadka, directly north of Baja, directly below Nagykanizsa. It then went to the Mura River and, following the river, until the mouth of the Lendva River. Leaving Lendvaújfalú to Hungary it continued along the watershed between the Lendva and the Kerka. (Krizman B., Hrabak B., eds., *Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije*, Belgrad, 1960, 317–318.)

⁶ Mitrović A., *Razgraničenje Jugoslavije*, Belgrade, 1969, 73.

Hungarian administration was no longer in place. It wanted to draw the border at the Maros River thus ensuring the safety of the Bácska and of Szabadka. In the case of the Bácska it used the same arguments emphasizing the region's importance due to its economy and transportation system and its Serb character.⁷ After they had dropped the strategic argument in the case of Baranya the Yugoslavs did not know exactly what to demand because they did not know the precise nationality ratios in that area. There were signs that they demanded Baranya so that they could later make concessions.⁸ After hearing the arguments the Supreme Council ordered that the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions Relating to Rumania and Yugoslavia, consisting of the representatives of the Great Powers, determine the borders of the SCS kingdom, except along the Adriatic.⁹ This was the period, until the end of March, 1919, when the Yugoslavs were quietly willing to give up some of their demands in order to get the territories they considered to be the most important ones.¹⁰

The territorial commission prepared its recommendation about the Hungarian-Yugoslav border on April 6, 1919. In the Bánát it left to Hungary the small area south of Szeged because it was ethnically and economically Hungarian and because it was directly adjacent to Szeged.¹¹ It did not comply therefore with the Yugoslav demand that the northern border be along the Maros. On the other hand, in the Bácska it received Zombor and Szabadka. The proposed border then followed the Dráva to the entry of the Mura River and then the Mura to the Austrian border. This meant that it would receive the Muraköz as well. The recommendation of the commission was accepted by the Council of Foreign Ministers without discussion on May 8 and four days later it was approved by the Council of Four which represented the heads of the four western Great Powers. This council replaced the Supreme Council in decision making.¹² Yugoslavia was satisfied with the results. Yet, in the third phase of the activities of the Yugoslav Peace Delegation, the period between April and August, they engaged in the policy of "small changes" and demanded adjustments in every section of the border.¹³

At the beginning of May the Yugoslav Peace Delegation announced its claim on Baranya up to the Mohács-Villány-Siklós line and in the Bácska on Baja. Thus, with the exception of Pécs and the Mecsek Mountain, they returned practically to the earlier proposal of General Pešić.¹⁴ It is reasonable to inquire why they waited until May to expand their territorial demands because by that time the territorial commission had already prepared its proposal and the Council of Four had accepted it on May 12 without any debate. The reason might have been that it was only now that the demographic reports, ordered at the beginning of the year, were received. It was only now that they realized that the percentage of the Yugoslavs was significantly larger than they had believed even if it was not quite as large as they had claimed at the Peace Conference. This would have entitled them to claim these territories on a nationality basis. The expansion of their territorial demands vis-à-vis Hungary at this time might have been due also to the fact that during the preparations for the intervention these demands might have received, in Belgrade's view, a more favorable consideration. Actually, they did not receive any significant changes. What's more, it was precisely during the frantic preparations for the intervention that the Allies ordered Yugoslavia to vacate Temesvár.

The Council of Heads of Delegations handed down its final decision about the Hungarian-Yugoslav border on August 1. By this Yugoslavia obtained some territorial concessions in Baranya.¹⁵ The Yugoslav request for the Muravidék was also approved.¹⁶ The Council of Heads of Delegations tabled the matter of the northern Bánát, south of Szeged, and referred it back to the territorial commission for further study. With this exception the Peace Conference considered the matter of the northern Yugoslav

⁷ Krizman, Hrabak, eds. *Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije*, 342–345.

⁸ Mitrović A., *Razgraničenje Jugoslavije*, 71.

⁹ Because of Italy this matter was too delicate for it to be delegated to a committee for resolution.

¹⁰ Mitrović A., *Razgraničenje Jugoslavije*, 250. Their "inclination" to make concessions can best be explained by their being unsure about the work of the committee, even though they did try to establish contacts with the experts of the Great Powers. A good example for this is in the fact that even though the committee stated its opinion about the Bácska at its meeting on February 28, saying that, "It would follow the line recommended by the Serbs," the Yugoslav Peace Delegation heard about it only in the middle of March and even then only unofficially. (Francis Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference*, 48.)

¹¹ With this he made it certain that Szeged would not become "non-viable."

¹² Francis Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference*, 434–441, 444–448.

¹³ Not only in the direction of Hungary but also in the direction of Romania (Bánát) and Austria (Carinthia).

¹⁴ Mitrović A., *Razgraničenje Jugoslavije*, 134.

¹⁵ In addition to the Dályok-Baranyavár railway line also the Monostor-Kiskőszeg one.

¹⁶ On the recommendation of its Border Commission, the The Council of Four awarded the Muravidék to Yugoslavia on July 9, 1919. The Yugoslav military occupied the area on August 12, 1919. Minister of the Interior Svetozar Pribičević, on September 2, assigned the entire territory to the jurisdiction of the Slovenian Territorial Government. (Attila Kovács, *Földreform és kolonizáció a Lendvavidéken a két világháború között* [Landreform and colonization in the Lendvavidék between the two World Wars], (PhD diss., Pécs University, 2002), 13.)

border to be resolved.¹⁷ Not so the Yugoslavs who were generally pleased with the results but still continued to come up with further and further demands. Realizing the any such demands could be obtained only from a vanquished country, they stopped their policy of “small adjustments” on all sections of the border. Instead they drafted their demands more against Hungary and these, if successful would not have been “small adjustments.”¹⁸ For Bácska and Baranya they increasingly returned to the Pešić line which they had abandoned in January and from which the deviations were the greatest in the Baranya area. After October, on the initiative of the noted geographer and ethnographer Jovan Cvijić and of the minister of transportation, they returned completely to the Pešić plans.¹⁹

In September the minister of transportation, citing economic reasons, asked the peace delegation that within the reparations clause it should arrange that Yugoslavia receive more coal from the Pécs mines after the signing of the peace treaty.²⁰ The minister did not raise the matter of the border adjustments, but Cvijić did. He studied the situation on site in September and, referring to his findings, made his recommendations. He also admitted that on the basis of the nationality principle they could not claim Pécs and therefore he defined a minimal (nationality) and a maximal (geographic) border. Citing the principle of natural borders he asked for the Mecsek Mountain as the northern border and citing the nationality principle he claimed Mohács.²¹ In buttressing the legitimacy of the demands official Yugoslavia also deviated from the earlier period. While earlier the nationality principle dominated the demands which were only complemented by economic and strategic arguments, in the case of the Pécs mines Yugoslavia relied on economic arguments. In order to acquire Mohács and Baja it raised the possibility of a plebiscite. This latter item came as a surprise because using the “weapon” of a plebiscite vis-à-vis defeated countries was considered to be the ultimate resort. The fact that it was raised could be explained by the endeavors to satisfy the Baranya demands which took such central position in the activities of the Yugoslav Peace Delegation at this time as had the attempts to obtain the central portions of the Bánát had taken during the first half of the year.

Initially Cvijić’s proposal and the minister of transportation’s initiative were not identical and they were handled separately and in parallel. It did not take much time for the parallel lines to meet. In the autumn of 1919 the Yugoslavs started a dual action. One recommended that Yugoslavia acquire the temporary right to exploit the Pécs mines and the other to expand the areas occupied in Baranya and to get Pécs. The demand for getting the coal soon merged with demands for additional territory. The official start of the action was the Yugoslavia note submitted to the Peace Conference on October 7. In this it requested that the exclusive right of Yugoslavia to exploit the Pécs coal basin for five years be added to the peace agreement with Hungary. Two weeks later, on the 22nd, the official note of the peace delegation asked that the entire Baranya, Mohács and Pécs be given to Yugoslavia. This opened the “Pécs question” which for whole year after the signing of the Peace Treaty impeded the normalization of Hungarian-Yugoslav relations.

Knowing the antecedents it is an interesting question whether Yugoslavia really wanted to acquire the territories under discussion or whether standing on the principle of “asking a lot to get a little” wanted to use this approach to get the mining rights to the Pécs coal mines. It is likely that it wanted to get Pécs even though no member of peace delegation thought that this would be possible.²² Furthermore, the Great

¹⁷ The Peace Conference officially notified the Yugoslav Peace Delegation about the Muravidék, the Dráva and the occupation of the Muravidék on August 2, about Bácska on August 5, and about the Baranya borders on August 19. (Mitrović A., *Razgraničenje Jugoslavije*, 178.)

¹⁸ Preparation for the peace treaty with Bulgaria and Austria were well advanced and this left Hungary which, because of its turbulent domestic situation, was still not present at the Paris Peace Conference.

¹⁹ It is important to emphasize that there was a significant difference between the January and end of summer Yugoslav demands. The January proposal about acquisition of Pécs could be viewed as the individual action of Pašić and Pešić, the new demands were initiated by the Belgrade government.

²⁰ The prime minister and the minister of transportation, Ljuba Davidović, instructed the Yugoslav Peace Delegation with a memorandum on September 15, that they should endeavor to assure at the Peace Conference, that Yugoslavia be given the right to mine the Pécs mines for five years after the Peace Treaty was signed. (336-41-1-VII, no. 11289, *Arhiv Jugoslavije*.)

²¹ Mitrović A., *Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira 1919-1920* [Yugoslavia at the Peace Conference, 1919-1920] (Belgrade, 1969), 144.

²² They were so doubtful about success that they received the order about asking for the mining rights in Pécs with great skepticism. Responding to the proposal of the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the delegation had not asked for the mining rights because it saw no chance for success. (See 336-41-1-VII, no. 11261 *Arhiv Jugoslavije*.) The Economic Committee of the delegation did not think that the Yugoslav claim was convincing that it had a great need for the Pécs coal because it knew that its loss would leave Hungary with practically no coal in view of the fact that most of the Hungarian coal had come from Transylvania that had been given to Romania. The delegation also considered the rumored

Powers were getting tired of the continuous Yugoslav demands and wanted to settle the question of the borders with Hungary. For this reason the Peace Conference asked the American member of the Allied Military Mission, General Harry Hill Bandholtz, to go to Yugoslavia after the completion of his visit to Romania²³ where he discussed the conditions and timing of the Romanian troops leaving Hungary.²⁴ The general's mission to Yugoslavia was similar to the one to Romania but in Belgrade it was much less successful. Neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor the General Staff or Prime Minister Ljubomir Davidović wanted to discuss evacuation.²⁵ It was not surprising therefore that when the Council of the Heads of Delegations received the newest demand from Yugoslavia, this time for Pécs, it immediately ordered Yugoslavia to vacate the occupied territories. In order to save time the Peace Conference did not go to the peace delegation but went directly to the Yugoslav High Command. This approach had worked for the Bánát but did not work for the evacuation of Baranya.²⁶

Lacking a better excuse the Yugoslavs tried to delay the evacuation by arguing about formalities. First they referred to the problems of the coal supplies in Serbia and with these tactics they hoped that they would not have to abandon the mines.²⁷ They considered their treatment to be unjust, resenting particularly the behavior of the Great Powers and their patience vis-à-vis the Gabriele D'Annunzio's adventure in Fiume. They claimed that the Yugoslav population in the contested area wanted to become part of that country and that its personal and economic safety could not be assured after the evacuation.²⁸ The claim that because of the shortage of coal Yugoslavia would be forced to stop the international trains could be considered to be blackmail.²⁹

The Allied missions in Hungary repeatedly sent its representatives to Baranya to try to convince the Yugoslavs to evacuate the area. It is a typical example of the behavior of the Yugoslav military and occupational forces that was demonstrated on November 22, in the case of the fact-finding Allied mission under the leadership of the American Lieutenant Colonel John B. Moore. He ordered the Yugoslavs to vacate the area above the temporary border, the Kiskőszeg-Bolmány line, and to do so within twenty-four hours. The Yugoslavs refused to comply. The prefect of Baranya and Pécs, Vladislav Pandurović, considered it to be the Hungarians' machinations with which Budapest wanted to frustrate the most recent Yugoslav endeavors to secure the Pécs coal mines. According to the prefect it was the Hungarians, learning about Cvijić's proposal, which considered the Dunaszekcső-Pécs-Szalánta-Siklós line to be ideal, who wanted to create a *fait accompli* and prevent the Yugoslavs from simply taking over the territories should the Peace Conference award them to it. For this reason the prefect recommended to the Belgrade government that it should under no circumstances abandon the line that it demanded in Paris on the basis of Cvijić's recommendation. If they did, they might find themselves in the same situation as Austria that was awarded the Burgenland but could not take control of it because it had no military forces in the area. Pandurović was convinced that if the Pécs coal mines were abandoned there would be a serious shortage of coal in the entire Vojvodina and that this might even lead to Bolshevism.³⁰ Belgrade agreed with Pandurović. In order to avoid any further supervision the Belgrade government instructed the local authorities to stop any mission that wanted to engage in planning the return of Pécs and Baja to Hungary. As an explanation it indicated that it had not received an answer yet from Paris about its latest demands.³¹

news to be highly adverse, namely the fact that it was almost exclusively British money that had been invested in the mines and thus Great Britain was not about to relinquish its right to mine the coal. (See 336-41-1-VII, no number, Arhiv Jugoslavije.)

²³ According to Bandholtz's claim he conducted the Bucharest negotiations strictly on his own initiative. (Harry Hill Bandholtz, *Napló nem diplomata módra [An Undiplomatic Diary]* (Budapest, 1993), 67.)

²⁴ The general reached an agreement with the king and with Bratianu that the Romanians could disarm the population, could take the most needed rolling stock and could, in agreement with the Allied representatives in Budapest, requisition food. As a compensatory measure, Romania had to evacuate its troops from the country so that Hungarian troops could move in and replace the Romanian ones. (See September 10, report, 395-2-9, confidential, no. 538, Arhiv Jugoslavije.)

²⁵ Vinaver V. *Jugoslavija i vojna intervencija protiv Mađarske 1919. godine*, *Исторјјски гласник*, 1967, бр 1-2, 97.

²⁶ Mitrović A., *Razgraničenje Jugoslavije*, 221.

²⁷ For the Yugoslav supplies of coal, see Smiljana Đurović, "Križa uglja na teritoriji Kraljevine SHS 1919. Godine" [The coal crisis in the territory of the Kingdom of SHS in 1919], *Acta Historico-Economica Iugoslaviae* (Zagreb), no 2. (1975): 67-80.

²⁸ According to the report from the Military Command in Baranya, more than 30,000 inhabitants of Baranya had stated that they did not dare to remain in their homes after the military had left and that they would leave Hungary with the soldiers. (See Mitrović A., *Razgraničenje Jugoslavije*, 228.)

²⁹ Telegram from Davidović to the delegation. (November 24, 1919, 336-41-1-VII, no. 13891, Arhiv Jugoslavije.)

³⁰ Because they could have no confidence that if the mines would be owned by Hungarians they would get even a single wagon of coal. Particularly because they were getting ready to take vengeance on the former Red Guards who were working peacefully in the mines. (396-2, confidential, no. 13957, Arhiv Jugoslavije.)

³¹ Krizman B., "Zapisnici asa sednica Davidoviceve dve vlade od avgusta 1919. do februara 1920" [Minutes of the cabinet meetings of the two Davidović governments from August 1919 to February 1920], *Arhivski vjesnik* 13, (1970): 65.

Nevertheless Belgrade prepared itself for the expected and repetitive denial from Paris. In order to get at least some benefits from the occupied territories the December 26 meeting of the Council of Ministers decided that, in the area of Baranya Yugoslavia would have to evacuate, all industries owned by the Hungarian state would be stripped of their machines and that these would be taken to Yugoslavia.³²

While the tug-of-war about Pécs and the mines was continuing the peace delegation turned to the Peace Conference with another request asking that the area of seventy-eight square kilometers with 5,000 people, assigned to Hungary because the change in the flow of the Dráva, be given to Yugoslavia.³³ The Peace Conference initially did not want to discuss this request but when they did take it up the request that would have established a Yugoslav bridgehead was denied because of the strong American and Italian objections.³⁴ Ante Trumbić and Ferdo Šišić, members of the Yugoslav Peace Delegation succeeded in making the American, who had voted against the request, to change his mind.³⁵ Their efforts bore fruit and at the December 9, session of the Council of Heads of Delegations agreed with the decision of the majority and, against Italy's protests, granted the Yugoslav request.³⁶

Even though the Peace Delegation and the Yugoslav government did everything to get the line of the border changed by submitting a series of memoranda and even having the local delegations asking for a transfer of their areas to Yugoslavia paraded before the council, they achieved very few changes. Accepting this, the peace delegation, after January 1920, took the position that they had to be satisfied with what they had received. Subsequently the Yugoslavs, with one or two exceptions, abandoned any further attempts to change the border line.³⁷ Instead of territorial gains they attempted to get economic ones. Their participation in the Pécs coal mines continued to be one of the most important endeavors but the peace delegation raised a number of other issues as well.³⁸

The economic, financial and reparation clauses of the Hungarian peace treaty were largely modeled on the Austrian peace treaty. The council continued to reserve the right to make reparation decisions to the Reparations Commission and rejected the proposal that the Yugoslavs themselves would determine what and how much they wanted. The council also rejected the demand that the Károly Huszár government take responsibility for what the Béla Kun government had done.³⁹ In financial matters the delegation was also not more successful. The commission rejected the recommendation that the purely Hungarian debt should be separated from the joint debt with Croatia and that Hungary should be responsible for that part of the joint debt that was determined as their share by the treaty.⁴⁰ They did receive permission, however, to liquidate the estates owned by Hungarian citizens, particularly the

³² *Ibid.*, 67–68. Other than for movables, such as raw materials and manufactured good, they did not want to take personal or community property and the ordinance completely protected hospitals and social structures.

³³ Mitrović A., *Razgraničenje Jugoslavije*, 236.

³⁴ Krizman B., Hrabak B., eds. *Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije*, 200.

³⁵ The French member of the territorial committee, Jules Laroché, recommended to the Yugoslavs that they should try to win over the American member of the committee, Isaiah Bowman. The Yugoslavs accepted the Frenchman's recommendation. The American objected, saying that the loss of 5,000 Croats was a minor matter for which it was not reasonable to jeopardize the natural borders and that the Yugoslavs should hold out for the old political borders or for the line of the Dráva as their border. Trumbić managed to dissuade him with the argument that the Dráva frequently changed its course and almost always shifted toward the south because the northern side was more elevated than the southern one. By shifting, the river would soon lose its role as a political border. These arguments were successful. Bowman agreed that the Yugoslavs could go to the Council of Heads of Delegations with their request but on condition that the Yugoslav arguments should be applied to the entire length of the Dráva and not just in those areas where they wanted to get some territories from the Hungarians. This condition, unfavorable to the Yugoslavs, was parried by Trumbić who cited a scientific argument according to which the course of the Dráva had been stabilized in several areas. (Naturally in those areas where it was favorable for Yugoslavia). In *ibid.*

³⁶ Mitrović A., *Razgraničenje Jugoslavije*, 237. The Yugoslav request that would have given them a bridgehead on Hungarian territory did not fit at all into the plans Italy had about Yugoslavia and in which Italy assigned a major role to Hungary.

³⁷ This was after the Peace Conference decidedly told them in April, in response to their request, that they could not count on any border modification vis-à-vis Hungary. (See Mitrović A., *Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira*, 145.)

³⁸ On the basis of the January 10, 1920, decision of the Foreign Ministers Council Hungary had to give Yugoslavia some of the Pécs coal but that the Reparation Committee had to decide how much.

³⁹ So far as responsibility was concerned Pašić believed in the principle of collective guilt. He did discuss this opinion one year earlier before the delegation in connection with the responsibility for the war but it did show how he felt about this matter in general. He explained that the responsibility for starting the war should not be limited to individuals or to rulers because this would reduce the responsibility of the people. He considered this principle to be particularly valid in the case of Bulgaria because, in his opinion, the entire Bulgarian nation was responsible for the war against Serbia. For this reason Pašić considered it unacceptable that King Ferdinand's responsibility should decrease the responsibility of the Bulgarian people. He believed that the eventual punishment of the ruler would exonerate the people of their responsibility. (Krizman B., Hrabak B., eds. *Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije*, 48.)

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 242–243. The January 17 session of the delegation.

entailed estates and the estates owned by the Church and by the monasteries.⁴¹ Beyond this change, however, the Great Powers, anxious to finalize the peace treaty, were not willing to go. In February, at the meeting of the heads of state of the Great Powers in London, the British drew Trumbić's attention to the fact that it was unlikely that the Yugoslavs would achieve any successes in the area of the economic clauses and it would be better if he made no further demands. He would thus avoid that the Hungarians have an opportunity to achieve changes to their benefit.⁴² Trumbić was told that concerning the borders it would be useful if Yugoslavia would join Czechoslovakia and Romania and have a unified approach. The Yugoslavs accepted this suggestion by the British and limited their activities versus Hungary to a minimum. In addition to the good advice of the British there were other weighty reasons for the Yugoslavs to stop their demands vis-à-vis Hungary. One year after the opening of the Peace Conference the Hungarian Peace Delegation arrived in Paris.

The appearance of the Hungarian delegation caused a considerable disturbance at the Peace Conference, particularly among the Successor States. Even though the delegation, under the leadership of Count Albert Apponyi, was virtually held prisoner in Neuilly and its role was limited to listening to the peace conditions and not to any discussion of them,⁴³ there was a concern that certain requests, such as the question of a plebiscite in the areas to be yielded, might find a sympathetic audience.⁴⁴ After the appearance of the Hungarian delegation Yugoslavia stopped any mention of a plebiscite and took the position that it would be a mistake to risk the already obtained territories. Particularly, as Pasić pointed out with some irony, the occupying Yugoslav administration had managed to antagonize the German and Jewish population that would very probably vote for the Hungarians in a plebiscite.⁴⁵ In Belgrade they had a different view on the situation. The Yugoslav government had not given up its hopes to obtain further territorial or economic gains and it continued to send to Paris delegations from the territories to be ceded. At the end of February it accepted Cvijić's recommendation and instructed the peace delegation to get in touch with the Hungarian delegation and raise the idea of a territorial exchange. Thus, after one year it again was proposed that an agreement about the borders should be reached by circumventing the Peace Conference. Just like in 1919, this was done on a Yugoslav initiative. Belgrade's views envisioned the exchange of the Horgos and its surroundings, almost 100 percent Hungarian, with the principally Yugoslav inhabited area around Baja. Belgrade also raised the possibility of a similar territorial exchange about Mohács.⁴⁶ The Hungarian delegation was not opposed to the idea but felt strongly that the timing was not right and therefore rejected the proposal. It believed that once the established borders were fixed by the peace treaty they could consider the possibility of a territorial exchange. Until then it would be unwise to take any chances particularly because Hungary was requesting a plebiscite in all of the disputed areas.⁴⁷ The Yugoslav delegation managed to convince the government and subsequently, accepting the achieved results, tacitly agreed with the conclusions of the Peace Conference and ceased to bother the Peace Conference any further. The Trianon Peace Treaty, signed on June 4, 1920, put a period to the shaping of the Hungarian-Yugoslav border.⁴⁸ This way the designated Hungarian-Yugoslav borders were legally recorded. There remain, however, the question of Baranya and Pécs, which was finally solved in August 1921 when the Yugoslavs troops were withdrawn from Hungary, but it is another story.

⁴¹ The Economic and Financial Committee of the Peace Conference accepted it, agreed verbally, and promised that it would obtain the written agreement of the Council of Heads of Delegations for the domestic legislature of Yugoslavia to regulate this question. (See Krizman B., Hrabak B., eds. *Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije*, 217, February 12 session.)

⁴² *Ibid.*, 271.

⁴³ Bánffy Miklós, *Huszonöt év [Twenty-Five Years]*, ed. Zoltán Major (Budapest, 1993), 37.

⁴⁴ Their concern was strengthened by the report of Lazar Bajić, their recently appointed representative in Budapest, who in the middle of December wrote that there was a new political trend in Hungary that believed that its representatives could make the Peace Conference change some of its decisions about Hungary's borders. (See Krizman B., Hrabak B., eds., *Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije*, 211.) The Hungarian government really did believe this but also felt that for it to happen it was essential that a different political leadership should emerge in France after the upcoming elections. This would explain why Hungary, after several requests, sent its representatives to Paris only in January when, in fact, they had been invited to participate in the Peace Conference as early as December. (See Magda Ádám, "Dunai konföderáció vagy kisantant?" [Danubian confederation or Little Entente?], *Történelmi Szemle* 20, nos. 3–4 (1977): 449.)

⁴⁵ Krizman, Hrabak, eds. *Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije*, 274.

⁴⁶ Mitrović A., *Razgraničenje Jugoslavije*, 242.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 243.

⁴⁸ Other than the modifications which were implemented on the basis of the decisions of the territorial committee.

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Сведения об авторе

Хорняк Арпад — Ph. D, главный научный сотрудник Института истории Венгерской академии наук, Будапешт, Венгрия.

Сфера научных интересов: история стран Центральной и Южной Европы, отношения Венгрии и Балканских стран.

Контактная информация: электронный адрес: hornyak.arpad@btk.mta.hu

Árpád Hornyák

TERRITORIAL DISPUTES BETWEEN HUNGARY AND THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES IN 1918–1921

The article analyzes the international situation in Central Europe in the period after World War I. Following the defeat and collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a number of sovereign states declared their independence. The borders of the newly-independent states were established by the victorious allied powers. At the Paris Peace Conference, the key goals of the major powers were identified, which eventually reshaped the territory of Europe. Delegates representing the victorious powers and the representatives of the defeated powers had unequal bargaining positions. The composition of delegations and their stances depended on the political climate in the countries they represented. The major powers moderated all complex conflict situations guided by their national priorities. The article focuses on the territorial disputes between Hungary and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in the Province of Vojvodina. The author highlights complex political, ethnic, and cultural factors which predetermined the relationships between the states which emerged after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Paris Peace Conference; Major Powers; Hungary; Kingdom of Serbs; Croats and Slovenes; borders; the city of Pécs

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Information about the author

Hornyák Árpád — Ph. D, leading researcher of the Institute of History at Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary.

Research interests: history of Central and Southern Europe, relations between Hungary and the Balkans.

Contact information: e-mail: hornyak.arpad@btk.mta.hu

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